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NOTES
PRETRIAL EXCLUSIONARY EVIDENCE RULINGS
Exclusionary rules of evidence developed in the Anglo-American
legal tradition as a means of controlling the trial jury.' Judicial
distrust of the jury's ability to appraise misleading or prejudicial
evidence prompted the adoption of a procedure whereby such prof-
fered evidence can be excluded upon objection by opposing coun-
sel.2  Under this procedure, counsel is obliged to wait until his
opponent has offered or requested the evidence before challenging
its admissibility.8 But the offer often suggests the content of the
exhibit, and the questions asked frequently foreshadow the antici-
pated answers. To erase the prejudicial effect of such offers or
requests, the jury is frequently instructed not to draw any infer-
ences from the questions asked nor to speculate about the content
of the excluded exhibits.4 Although the futility of such instruc-
tions soon became apparent, the courts have persistently held that
objections made at the trial prior to the offer of evidence are pre-
mature.5
The first attempt to challenge the inflexibility of this established
procedure by means of a pretrial motion to exclude was apparently
made in Bradford v. Birmingham Electric Company" in 1933.7
1 Although trial by jury is now used infrequently in England, it has
retained much of its importance in the United States. J. FRANK, COURTS
ON TRIAL 109 (1949).
Thayer's assertion in F. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
266 (1898) that the English law of evidence is the "child of the jury sys-
tem" has been challenged by Morgan, who suggests that our exclusionary
rules of evidence are the result of "several factors . . . judicial distrust of
the jury" being but one of them. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary
Rules of Evidence, 4 U. Cm. L. REV. 247, 258 (1936). Nevertheless, "while
some doubt has been cast on the thesis that the inception of evidentiary
rules in most cases corresponds with the emergence of the jury as an
established fact-finding body, the continued vitality of the jury is certainly
the principal justification for their retention today." Broeder, The Func-
tions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 386, 397 (1954); J.
FRANK, supra at 123.
2 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENC E § 52, at 115 (1954).
3 See Hanson v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Mut. Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 321, 322-
23 (1878); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 52, at 115; 1 J. WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 18, at 323 (3d ed. 1940); 88 C.J.S. Trial § 119 (1955).
4 C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 52, at 116.
5 "[A] general objection was made . . . before the witness had given
any testimony. This was not the time to raise such an objection ....
Courts, in ruling on the admission of evidence, are expected to pass upon
particular matter offered, and not to decide abstract propositions in ad-
vance of any offer." Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Johnson, 95 Tex. 409, 410, 67
S.W. 768, 769 (1901).
6 227 Ala. 285, 149 So. 729 (1933). The trial court's dismissal of the
motion was upheld on appeal on the grounds that "there is no rule of law
or practice in this state which authorized the procedure called for by
plaintiff's said motion." Id. at 287, 149 So. at 730.
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Since then, requests for pretrial evidence rulings have been made
with increasing frequency in both civil and criminal litigation.8
rt is perhaps characteristic of the motion's infancy that it has not
yet received a name by which it is universally known. However,
because its function is to prohibit opposing counsel from offering
or requesting allegedly improper evidence in the presence of the
jury,10 it will be called a "motion to exclude" for purposes of this
note. A motion to exclude may be presented at any time prior to
the offer of evidence, but only those motions that are filed for a
separate pretrial hearing or submitted during a pretrial conference
will be discussed herein." The motion to exclude typically re-
quests both a binding court order prohibiting the communication of
the evidence to the jury and a determination of admissibility. The
court's order is always made at the time the motion is presented,
but the admissibility determination may be postponed until the
time of the trial, provided that the evidence is offered out of the
hearing of the jury.1 2
Although the pretrial motion to exclude is now being used with
increasing frequency in both state and federal litigation,8 the full
potential of this novel procedural device has not yet been devel-
7 Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1091 (1964). Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) and Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106, 111 (1927)
established the pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized in violation of
the fourth amendment right of privacy. Many states followed suit. Be-
cause this pretrial motion to suppress illegally seized evidence has a spe-
cial history and is often governed by specific rules or statutes, it ought not
to be confused with the pretrial motion to exclude, which is the subject
of this note.
8 Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1088 (1964).
9 In Texas, pretrial exclusionary procedures are referred to as "mo-
tions in limine." Davis, The Motion in Limine-A Neglected Trial Tech-
nique, 5 WASHBURN L.J. 232 (1966). Elsewhere, they are variously referred
to as "motions ad limine," "motions to suppress," and "motions to exclude."
Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1090 (1964); Kromzer, Advantages to Be Gained
by Trial Motions for the Plaintiff, 6 S. TEX. L.J. 179 (1963).
10 Bridges v. Richardson, 163 Tex. 292, 354 S.W.2d 366 (1962); Annot.,
94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1099 (1964); Davis, supra note 9, at 232.
ii Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1088-89 (1964).
This note will focus upon motions to exclude noticed prior to the trial
because it is these motions which present special procedural problems.
However, those sections of the note dealing with value and legitimacy re-
late with equal force to motions to exclude presented during the trial. If
the admissibility determination hinges upon the circumstances of the trial,
it may be preferable to notice the motion after the trial has begun.
12 Kromzer, supra note 9, at 185-86.
13 Of the state and federal cases discovered by this author, 23 were
decided between 1960 and 1966. How many pretrial evidence rulings are
either buried in the cases or unreported must remain a matter for spec-
ulation. Because no reference could be found to the pretrial motion to
exclude in Wisconsin appellate decisions, a questionnaire was sent to 90
practitioners located throughout the state in an effort to determine whether
the motion had actually been incorporated into Wisconsin practice. Of the
23 replies received, 10 reported utilization of the motion.
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oped.' 4 Consequently, the initial sections of this note will be de-
voted to a consideration of the motion's value and legitimacy.
Subsequent sections will concentrate upon the types of evidence is-
sues which can profitably be determined prior to trial and the
procedural effect of incorporating exclusionary evidence rulings
into pretrial practice.
I. THE VALUE OF PRETRIAL EVIDENCE RULINGS IN PROMOTING FAIR
Aim EFFICIENT JURY TRIALS
As was noted in the introductory comments, the traditional ex-
clusionary rules of evidence developed largely as a result of ju-
dicial concern for the litigants' right to a fair and impartial jury
trial. But the courts' insistence that objections be made following
the offer of evidence has prevented these rules from fully accom-
plishing their avowed purpose. This can perhaps best be illus-
trated by reference to the not uncommon practice of posing prej-
udicial questions.' 5 Under the traditional exclusionary procedure,
a shrewd trial lawyer can phrase his inquiry so that the prejudice
consists largely in the presentation of the question. 6 Opposing
counsel is then placed in a most perplexing position. If he objects,
it will call the jury's attention to the improper evidence and create
the impression that his client has something to hide.'7 On the
other hand, if he remains silent, he will waive his objection for
purposes of appeal.' s Consequently, if he thinks that he can get a
14 Legal commentators have generally approved pretrial evidence rul-
ings, but without amplified discussion. Moore states simply that the pre-
trial judge may rule on the admissibility of evidence. 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 9 16.16 (2d ed. 1948). McCormick says only that a pretrial con-
ference would be an appropriate time to obtain a "tentative ruling" on
certain evidence questions. C. McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 152, at 320 n.29.
Several full-length discussions of the pretrial motion to exclude have
recently appeared in legal periodicals. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 9;
Kromzer, supra note 9; Comment, The Evidence Ruling at Pretrial in the
Federal Courts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1016 (1966).
15 Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1089 (1937); Davis, supra note 9, at 233.
16 State v. Smith, 189 Wash. 422, 428, 65 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1937); 3 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 3, f1 1808, at 276; Davis, supra note 9, at 233; 19 LA. L.
REV. 881, 883 (1959).
17 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 52, at 121; Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1089,
1091 (1937); Armstrong, Objections to Evidence in Jury Trials: A Multiple
Review, 23 TENN. L. REV. 943, 945-47 (1955); Note, Improper Argument to
Juries in Civil Cases, 43 MINN. L. REV. 545, 561-62 (1959).
18 J. CONWAY, WISCONSIN AND FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 53.08, 74.10
(1966); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 52, at 115. E.g., Beijer v. Beijer, 11
Wis. 2d 207, 105 N.W.2d 348 (1960). "Appeal will lie without objection
being raised only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or where the preju-
dice could not have been cured by any action of the trial court." Note,
Misconduct of Judges and Attorneys During Trial: Informal Sanctions, 49
IOWA L. REV. 531, 543 (1964). Under Wis. STAT. § 251.09 (1965), for exam-
ple, the supreme court may in its discretion reverse the judgment appealed
from and order a new trial in the interests of justice even though proper
objections were not made at the trial. Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling
Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 93 N.W.2d 467 (1958).
[VOL. 1967:738
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favorable ruling, he will ordinarily voice an objection. 9 Yet even
if counsel's objection is sustained, the improper question will
rarely be so prejudicial as to provide grounds for a new trial or a
reversal.20 Therefore, he will have to rely upon the trial court's
application of "curative measures" to remove the harm done.21
And while the use of these "curative measures" can perhaps
be justified in terms of judicial economy, 22 its effectiveness in
removing the prejudicial impact of an improper question is subject
to serious doubt.23 In fact, it has been shown that the repetition
of the improper evidence necessitated by the application of these
curative measures may serve to implant the evidence even more
firmly in the minds of the jurors.24
19 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 52, at 122; I. GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECH-
NIQUE § 422 (1935).
20 "The cases bear much intrinsic evidence of the fact that trial courts
are slow to set aside verdicts because of misconduct of counsel in examina-
tion of witnesses." Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1089, 1096 (1937).
21 Walzer, Misconduct of an Attorney During Trial, 7 PRAC. LAW. 92,
97-98 (1961).
The following curative measures are frequently utilized: (1) sustained
objection and motion to strike; (2) instruction to disregard; (3) reprimand
of offending counsel; and (4) withdrawal of improper argument. C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 2, § 52, at 115; Note, supra note 17, at 549.
22 Since it is virtually impossible to conduct an errorless trial, curative
measures are currently utilized to reduce the number of appeals taken from
evidence rulings. Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of
Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3 VILL. L. REV. 48, 50 (1957).
23 The effectiveness of curative measures is based upon the presumption
that juries do what judges tell them to do. However, proponents of the
"realistic theory" have challenged the validity of this presumption:
"[O]ften the jury are neither able to, nor do they attempt to, apply the
instruction of the court." J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 111.
Assuming that the jurors are able to erase the evidence from their
minds, they will often not be interested in performing the intellectual
surgery entailed in disregarding that which they have just heard. Inde-
pendent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 671
(9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Sacramento & San Joa-
quin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d 60, 68, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847, 853
(1963), modified, 217 Cal. App. 2d 611, 31 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963); C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 2, § 53, at 123.
24 Rice v. United States, 149 F.2d 601, 604 (10th Cir. 1945) (repeated
instructions to disregard which "emphasized, stressed, and [gave] prom-
inence" to prejudicial evidence were held grounds for reversal on appeal).
The results of the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law
School provide some evidence that instructions to disregard sensitize the
jury to the excluded evidence. Where defendant disclosed that he had
insurance and no objection was made, the average award was $37,000;
where defendant's disclosure was followed by an objection and an instruc-
tion to disregard, the average award rose to $46,000. Broeder, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754 (1959). Moreover,
instructions to disregard are normally given twice. A specific instruction
is given immediately after the objectionable evidence is offered; a general
charge for the jury "to disregard all [stricken] testimony" is then given
at the close of the case. WIs. J.I.--CVM INST. No. 130 (1960).
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Pretrial evidence rulings provide a much more effective means
of protecting the litigant's right to an impartial jury trial. If a pre-
trial motion to exclude is granted, the court will order opposing
counsel to make no reference to the evidence at the trial within the
hearing of the jury.25 This virtually eliminates the danger that
the evidence will be introduced under the guise of a question pro-
pounded to a witness.26  It also eliminates the necessity of re-
lying upon curative measures to safeguard the parties against the
prejudicial impact that a submission of improper evidence may
have upon the jury.27
Nevertheless, the utility of the pretrial motion to exclude is
subject to certain important limitations. For example, the mov-
ing party must show that he has reason to believe that improper evi-
dence will in fact be offered.28 Furthermore, the motion is effective
only when the issue of admissibility can reasonably be determined
prior to the offer of evidence at the trial.29 And lastly, the pretrial
order is binding only upon the opposing party and his counsel, mak-
ing it possible for an unsuspecting witness to volunteer the informa-
25 The following are exemplary of the prohibitive clauses frequently
found in pretrial motions to exclude:
"Wherefore, plaintiff prays that this court . . . order and instruct de-
fendant and his counsel not to elicit testimony respecting, mention, or refer
to, either directly or indirectly ... [the evidence in question]." Annot., 94
A.L.R.2d 1087, 1099 (1964).
"Wherefore, plaintiff respectfully requests the court to instruct the
defendant and all its counsel not to mention, refer to, interrogate concern-
ing, -or attempt to convey to the jury in any manner, either directly or
indirectly, any of the above mentioned facts, without first obtaining per-
mission of the court outside the presence and hearing of the jury ... "
Davis, supra note 9, at 232 n.1.
26 E.g., Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)
(violation of preliminary exclusionary ruling held grounds for reversal on
appeal).
27 Davis, supra note 9, at 233; Kromzer, supra note 9, at 179; Comment,
supra note 14, at 1029.
28 Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1098-99 (1964); see, e.g., the following ex-
cerpt from a pretrial motion filed in Popp v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co.,
No. 329878 (Cir. Ct., Milwaukee Co., Branch 8, filed April 16, 1965):
"[D]efendants are aware of said facts hereinbefore set forth, by virtue of
deposition taken on the plaintiff, and further, . . . counsel for the defend-
ants has indicated to your affiant that he intends to ask questions relating to
the marital status of the plaintiff .... " Failure to make such an allegation
may prompt the court to deny the motion to exclude on the grounds that it
will not assume "that an attorney licensed to practice before it would offer
illegal or incompetent testimony." Bradford v. Birmingham Elec. Co., 227
Ala. 285, 287, 149 So. 729, 730 (1933). For a suggestion that expanded pre-
trial discovery techniques may aid counsel in anticipating his opponent's
offer of inadmissible evidence see Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist.
v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d 60, 68, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847, 853, modified, 217 Cal.
App. 2d 611, 31 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).
29 LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Air Lines, 344 F.2d 266, 274 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965); Kromzer, supra note 9, at 183;
Comment, supra note 14, at 1032-33.
[VOL. 1967:738
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tion in response to a perfectly innocuous question.80
In spite of these limitations, pretrial exclusionary evidence rul-
ings are effective in reducing the harmful impact of prejudicial
evidence. Unless the court makes a pretrial exclusionary order,
there is very little to deter counsel from offering some evidence at
the trial in such a way that it will have an improper influence upon
the jury. Of course, it is unethical to offer evidence which counsel
"knows the court should reject in order to get the same before the
jury."31 And no question of doubtful propriety should be asked
without first obtaining a ruling out of the hearing of the jury.8 2
But it is generally recognized that ethics are more a matter of
good practice than of strict enforcement.3 3 And since severe sanc-
tions are rarely imposed by the trial court, there is little to deter an
experienced lawyer from gambling on the application of "curative
measures" to erase the prejudicial effect of his improper offer of
evidence.3 4 Tactically, it is a risk worth taking, for only when the
evidence is highly prejudicial will the courts order a mistrial, new
trial, or reversal on appeal.3 5
30 Comment, supra note 14, at 1033.
81 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs No. 22.
82 In the Code of Trial Conduct promulgated by the American College
of Trial Lawyers, the following provisions deal with the introduction of
inadmissible evidence:
15 COURTROOM CONDUCT.
(d) A lawyer should not include in the content of any question the
suggestion of any matter which is obviously inadmissible.
(g) In all cases in which there is any doubt about the propriety of
any disclosure to the jury, requests should be made for leave
to approach the bench and to obtain a ruling out of the jury's
hearing, either by making an offer of proof or by propounding
the question and obtaining an immediate ruling.
43 A.B.A.J. 223, 226 (1957).
88 Walzer, Conduct of the Attorney During Trial, 7 PRAC. LAW. 60 (1961).
Usually disbarment or contempt proceedings are brought only after the
court has repeatedly warned the offender and he has ignored the court's
ruling. Libby, Misconduct of the Trial Attorney, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 439,
440 (1961).
Generally speaking, the organized bar is not prepared to invoke self-
discipline in this area. For example, the McCracken survey showed that
in eight of the twenty-five states reporting, it is common practice for law-
yers to offer evidence which they 'know will be rejected. McCracken,
Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37 VA.
L. REV. 399, 409 (1951). See generally V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, THE
LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 238-43 (1966); 0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoY, CON-
DUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 59-129 (1952).
34 Annot, 109 A.L.R. 1089 (1937); Note, supra note 17, at 564; see note
21 supra and accompanying text.
85 Note, supra note 17, at 563-64. Although counsel who makes an offer
of inadmissible evidence runs the risk of having a judgment for his client
reversed, it is doubtful that even the possibility of a reversal is a sufficient
deterrent to-such conduct. V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, supra note 33,
at 243.
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Once a pretrial motion to exclude has been granted, the mov-
ing party has a binding court order instructing opposing coun-
sel to make no reference to the excluded evidence within the
hearing of the jury 5 The court has an obligation to enforce this
order.87 Therefore, if reference is made to the forbidden evidence,
not only is the risk of a mistrial, new trial, or reversal greatly
increased,88 but counsel himself faces the threat of a reprimand or
contempt citation.3 9  Consequently, the pretrial evidence ruling
provides an effective means of deterring counsel from offering im-
proper evidence because it warns him in advance that the court
will not only exclude his offer of evidence at the trial, but may also
use it as a basis for a new trial or a contempt order.
Opponents of the pretrial motion to exclude have suggested that
the motion will increase the total amount of time devoted to evi-
dentiary rulings because it will encourage litigants to make a
greater number of objections, 40 particularly to evidence which
may never be offered.41 Although this criticism deserves consid-
eration, it must be placed in its proper perspective. In the first
place, the frequency with which the motion can be used is auto-
matically subject to one important limitation: Pretrial evidence
rulings can be requested only when counsel can establish reason to
believe that the evidence will in fact be offered at the trial.42
Beyond that, excessive use of the motion will have to be curbed by
self-imposed standards of moderation.43  In the second place, pre-
trial evidence rulings frequently reduce, rather than increase, the
86 Davis, supra note 9, at 232; Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1099 (1964).
837 "There is a duty upon the court to rule decisively .... [The judge]
must enforce his [pretrial evidence] rulings. Violations of a court's solemn
rulings should 'lead to serious consequences.'" Burdick v. York Oil Co.,
364 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Kromzer, supra note 9, at 181-82.
38 Kromzer, supra note 9, at 181-82.
The pretrial evidence ruling can also serve to "enhance harm" under
the harmless error rules. Id. at 179; e.g., Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. v.
White, 152 Tex. 619, 629, 262 S.W.2d 99, 104 (1953).
89 "The presentation of excluded matter to the jury by suggestion, by
the wording of a question, or by indirection, violates professional standards
and counsel's duty to the court." Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766,
770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Walzer, supra note 21, at 97. Although the court
will not normally punish counsel for a spontaneous injection of known
"legally irrelevant" matters, when it has made a preliminary exclusionary
ruling, it will quite often chastise offending counsel openly in the presence
of the jury. Kromzer, supra note 9, at 182.
40 "Removal of the inhibiting factor of fear of alienating jury or judge
will result in a multiplication of objections to evidence." Comment, supra
note 14, at 1031.
41 Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 3'Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 16.261, Case 1
(N.D. Ill. 1960); Johns v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 503, 236 S.W.2d 820 (1951).
42 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
43 "The writer feels that only those matters which are very damaging
to one's case, and which are clearly inadmissible should be urged. In this
way the trial court is not reluctant to pass on a limited number of prob-
lems." Kromzer, supra note 9, at 185.
[VOL. 1967:738
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total amount of time spent in litigation. 4 For example, the motion
can be employed to prevent the introduction of time-consuming or
diversionary collateral evidence. 45 It can be used to decrease the
number of interruptions at the trial for objections and disputes con-
cerning admissibility. 46 It may also serve to decrease the number
of mistrials, new trials, and reversals based upon the introduction of
prejudicial evidence.47 Finally, should an increased amount of
time be spent in resolving a particular dispute, this will often
merely reflect the fact that the court gave more careful considera-
tion to the evidence problems presented by the motion to exclude,
requesting the submission of briefs and researching difficult ad-
missibility issues before delivering the pretrial exclusionary rul-
ing.48
In certain instances, then, the pretrial motion to exclude may pro-
long the total time devoted to evidentiary problems. Generally
speaking, however, it will ensure the swifter, smoother resolution of
possible conflicts at the trial, thereby satisfying the current de-
mands for efficiency and economy in judicial administration.
Moreover, in those instances when the pretrial motion does delay
the disposition of the case, the litigants should be more than com-
pensated by the improvement in both the quality of the evidentiary
rulings and the effectiveness of the court's enforcement of their
right to an impartial jury trial.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF PRETRIAL EVIDENCE RULINGS
Pretrial exclusionary evidence rulings may be made at a separate
hearing prior to trial or at the pretrial conference. In either set-
ting, the legitimacy of the pretrial motion to exclude has frequently
been challenged on the grounds that it calls for a piecemeal deter-
mination of matters going to the merits of the case. An additional
problem has arisen as to the authority of the judge to make coercive
evidence rulings in the consensual atmosphere of the pretrial con-
ference.
The practice of objecting at the trial originated in the Anglo-
American tradition that each litigant should have his "day in
44 Comment, supra note 14, at 1017. "A factor seldom mentioned in the
discussion of the reduction of court time and litigant expense which the
pretrial evidence ruling may effect is the impetus such rulings may give to
out of court settlement .... ." Id. at 1030.
45 Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d
656, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).46 Davis, supra note 9, at 233; Kromzer, supra note 9, at 181; Comment,
supra note 14, at 1029-30.
47 Assuming that the court's order will not often be violated (which
would tend to increase the number of new trials and reversals), pretrial
evidence rulings will help to eliminate: (1) challenges to the effectiveness
of curative measures taken by the trial court; and (2) new trials and re-
versals based upon the introduction of incurably prejudicial evidence.
. 48 Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1092 (1964); Davis, supra note 9, at 233.
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court"; that his trial should be conducted cohesively from start to
finish in the presence of the court and jury, each performing its
respective function.49 In keeping with this tradition, several courts
have refused to recognize the legitimacy of the pretrial motion to
exclude, asserting that "there is no occasion, prior to trial, to seek
test rulings . . . upon questions of admissibility. '50 However,
crowded court calendars and the growing complexities of contem-
porary litigation have necessitated the development of a variety of
pretrial procedures designed to speed and simplify the course of
justice and to ensure the litigants an impartial jury trial.5 ' Note-
worthy among these have been the pretrial conference,5 2 the mo-
tion for summary judgment,53 and the motion to suppress illegally
seized evidence.5 4 Clearly, such procedural innovations have made
serious inroads into the doctrine that matters concerning the merits
of a case should not be decided piecemeal prior to the time of the
trial.55 Therefore, by way of analogy, they have provided an im-
portant precedent which has greatly facilitated the recent recogni-
tion of the legitimacy of the pretrial motion to exclude.3
Although an increasing number of courts now do recognize the
motion's legitimacy, there are still no state or federal statutes which
expressly create a pretrial procedure for excluding inadmissible
evidence. 57 Consequently, the authority for making such pretrial
rulings at formal hearings has been held to proceed from the trial
40 Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1089 (1964); see note 1 supra and accom-
panying text.
50 State v. Flett, 234 Ore. 124, 129-30, 380 P.2d 634, 637 (1963). E.g.,
Bradford v. Birmingham Elec. Co., 227 Ala. 285, 287, 149 So. 729, 730 (1933);
Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Ore. 426, 430, 374 P.2d 896, 898 (1962); Padgett v.
State, 364 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Crim. 1963); Bills v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 369,
327 S.W.2d 751 (1959); Arrington v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 20, 21, 296 S.W.
2d 537, 539 (1956); Johns v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 503, 506, 236 S.W.2d 820,
822 (1951).
51 H. NIMS, PRE-TIAL 3-12 (1950); Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1089 (1964).
52 FED. R. Civ. P. 16; Wis. STAT. § 269.65 (1965). The pretrial confer-
ence has been adopted in some form by forty-four states.
53 FED. R. Civ. P. 56; WIs. STAT. § 270.635 (1965).
54 FED. R. CiUM. P. 41(e); WIs. STAT. § 955.09(3) (1965). The purpose
of this motion is "to prevent interruptions and delays in a trial, brought
about by attacks on the legality of searches and evidence seized thereby."
Rodgers v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 670, 677 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 267
F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1959); see note 7 supra. The motion permits the issue of
legality to be decided without the jury hearing an account of "the embar-
rassing facts" leading to the search and seizure. Note, 44 CALIF. L. REV.
164, 166 (1956); Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-11 (1965), which provides
for a pretrial motion to suppress involuntary confessions.
55 Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1092 (1964).
66 See Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App.
2d 60, 68, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852-53, modified, 217 Cal. App. 2d 611, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 754 (1963); Comment, supra note 14, at 1023-24.
5T Davis, supra note 9, at 234. It should be noted, however, that there
are broad statutory provisions in some jurisdictions authorizing the use of
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court's inherent power to admit or exclude evidence.5 This has
inevitably led to a lack of uniformity in the adoption of the motion.
In some jurisdictions, for example, the courts have conclusively es-
tablished the legitimacy of the pretrial motion to exclude.59 In
others, it has been left within the trial court's discretion to deter-
mine in each case whether it will recognize the motion's validity.60
Similarly, some courts rule on the admissibility of the evidence
when the motion is first presented,61 while others postpone the
evidence ruling until the time of the trial, ordering counsel to pre-
sent the evidence first to the court out of the hearing of the jury.62
Statutory codification would not only promote uniformity in the
adoption of the pretrial motion to exclude, but would also com-
pletely eliminate current doubts concerning the legitimacy of this
pretrial technique. No longer would it be within the court's discre-
tion to accept or reject the motion on a case by case basis. Rather,
if the admissibility issue is clearly capable of determination prior to
the trial, the court would be required to rule decisively on the mo-
tion at the time of its presentation. If, on the other hand, there are
pretrial motions to raise "any defense or objection which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue." WIs. STAT. § 955.09
(1965); Platz, The 1949 Revision of the Wisconsin Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 28, 46-48. Arguably, such statutes encompass pre-
trial motions to exclude inadmissible evidence.
58 Davis, supra note 9, at 234; Kromzer, supra note 9, at 179.
59 E.g., Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App
2d 60, 68, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852-53 (1963), modified, 217 Cal. App. 2d 611,
31 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963); Bradbeer v. Scott, 193 Cal. App. 2d 575, 577, 14
Cal. Rptr. 458, 459 (1961); State v. Hawthorne, 90 N.J. Super. 545, 549, 218
A.2d 430, 432 (1966); State v. Baker Bros. Nursery, 366 S.W.2d 212, 214
(Tex. 1963); Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
Unlike the Texas civil courts, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals does not
recognize the legitimacy of the pretrial motion to exclude, apparently be-
cause it has confused it with the motion to suppress, which is not recog-
nized in Texas. In the only case which distinguishes between the two
motions, the court did uphold the trial court's pretrial exclusionary evi-
dence ruling. Scarborough v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 83, 87, 344 S.W.2d 886,
889 (1961). In other jurisdictions, the courts have recommended the uti-
lization of the motion to exclude. Radmacher v. Cardinal, 264 Minn. 72,
78, 117 N.W.2d 738, 742 (1962); O'Neil v. Kappesser, 243 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714,
(Sup. Ct. 1963); Crawford v. Hite, 176 Va. 69, 10 S.E.2d 561 (1940).
60 E.g., Cook v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 414 Pa. 154, 160, 199 A.2d 446,
449 (1964); State v. Morgan, 192 Wash. 425, 430, 73 P.2d 745, 747 (1937).
61 E.g., Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App.
2d 60, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963), modified 217 Cal. App. 2d 611, 31 Cal. Rptr.
754 (1963); Jackson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 529, 133 S.E.2d 436 (1963); State
v. Hawthorne, 90 N.J. Super. 545, 218 A.2d 430 (1966); Huff v. New York
Cent. R.R., 12 DEFENSE L.J. 310 (1963), aff'd on other grounds, 116 Ohio
App. 32, 186 N.E.2d 478 (1961); Cook v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 414 Pa.
154, 199 A.2d 446 (1964); see Kromzer, supra note 9, at 185.
62 E.g., McClintock v. Travelers Ins. Co., 393 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965); Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963);
Scarborough v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 83, 344 S.W.2d 886 (1961); see
Kromzer, supra note 9, at 185.
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certain admissibility issues which will not admit of pretrial deter-
mination, the statute should give the judge a certain amount
of discretion (1) to dismiss the motion without prejudice to the
moving party, or (2) to defer his ruling until the time of the
trial, subject to the stipulation that the evidence be presented first
to the court out of the hearing of the jury.63 The latter procedure
would provide greater protection to the moving party, for it would
prohibit the indirect disclosure of the evidence to the jury before an
admissibility determination had been made. This, in turn, would
eliminate the necessity for requesting the application of curative
measures following the rejection of the evidence at the trial.
When the motion to exclude is presented for determination at a
pretrial conference (as opposed to a separate hearing on the mo-
tion), questions arise concerning the power of the judge to make
exclusionary evidence rulings. To be legitimate, pretrial confer-
ence rulings must fall within the ambit of authority conferred upon
the court by Federal Rule 16 or by similarly-worded state statutes. 4
In other words, the pretrial judge must be empowered to rule co-
ercively on questions of law presented by one party to the action.
However, the history of the formulation and adoption of Federal
Rule 16 suggests that the power of the judge at pretrial was not
meant to be coercive.65 The rule itself is cast in consensual terms.
Moreover, many legal commentators have insisted that pretrial is
not to serve as a substitute for the trial;6 6 that the conference is to
63 E.g., Wis. STAT. § 955.09 (1965), which provides for a pretrial motion
to raise any defense or objection which is capable of determination without
the trial of the general issue. It also provides that "the motion shall be
determined before trial . . . unless the court orders that it be deferred for
determination at such trial." Id. § 955.09(5).
64 Comment, supra note 14, at 1017; see 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
ff .501(2) (2d ed. 1960). WIS. STAT. § 269.65 (1965) is an excellent exam-
ple of a state statute containing virtually the same wording as Federal Rule
16, which provides:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attor-
neys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the plead-
ings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of docu-
ments which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a
master for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be
by jury;(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.
63 The first draft of the rule provided that the court, upon motion of
any party or upon its own motion, could exclude from the trial any issue
as to which it found there was no substantial dispute. The provision was
subsequently dropped. W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 471 n.1 (rev. ed. C. Wright 1960).66 H. NIms, supra note 51, at 153-54; Clark, Summary and Conclusion
to an Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, 29 F.R.D. 454, 461: (1962); Louisell,
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be "informational and factual," not "legal and coercive. ' 67 As for
the pretrial judge's specific ability to rule coercively on the admissi-
bility of evidence, Federal Rule 16 merely authorizes the court "to
consider . .. [t]he possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof." It would therefore
appear that pretrial conferences were designed solely: (1) to pro-
cure the presentation and identification of papers, documentary evi-
dence, and exhibits which the parties propose to offer at the trial;
and (2) to obtain agreements as to the reception of documents in
evidence and as to specific material facts which are not in dispute.68
Nonetheless, since pretrial's inception, judges have been ruling
coercively on questions of law.6 9 Normally, they cite the catchall
clause ("such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the ac-
tion") as authority for their actions.7 0 It is maintained that such rul-
ings will advance the overriding purpose of the pretrial conference,
which is to promote the swift resolution of the case.7 1 In keeping
with this concern for economy in judicial administration, pretrial
judges will usually decide motions pending at the time of the con-
ference if they have been authorized for pretrial determination by
procedural rules or statutes.7 2  They will also rule on statutory
Discovery and Pretrial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV. 633,
664 (1952). E.g., Lynn v. Smith, 281 F.2d 501, 506 (3rd Cir. 1960); Klitzke
v. Herm, 242 Wis. 456, 463, 8 N.W.2d 400, 403 (1943). These authorities
warn against transferring to the pretrial judge the traditional jury func-
tion of resolving factual issues.
67 Clark, supra note 66, at 456.
68 88 C.J.S. Trial § 17(2) (1955); Louisell, supra note 66, at 666; Ryan
& Wickhem, Pre-Trial Practice in Wisconsin Courts, 1954 Wis. L. REV. 5,
14, 30.
69 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 16.16, at 1121-22 (2d ed. 1960); H.
NIMs, supra note 51, at 141; Comment, supra note 14, at 1018; 72 YALE L.J.
383, 386-91 (1962).
70 Berger v. Brannan, 172 F.2d 241, 243 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 941 (1949); Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Penn v. Auto. Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 337 (D. Ore. 1939); Edenfield v. Crisp,
186 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). "[The catch-all clause]
• ..is all-inclusive and of great importance, for within its reach almost
anything may be considered and become the subject of decisive action."
Delehant, The Pre-trial Conference in Practical Employment: Its Scope and
Technique, 28 NEB. L. REV. 1, 23 (1948).
71 Louisell, supra note 66, at 663; 72 YALE L.J. 383, 386, 391 (1962).
72 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 16.09, at 1114 (2d ed. 1960); Kincaid,
A Judge's Handbook of Pretrial Procedure, 17 F.R.D. 439, 442 (1955);
Comment, supra note 14, at 1018-19. The motions most commonly pending
are the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. H. NiMs,
supra note 51, at 132, 140, 153-54. It is not uncommon for the rules of
practice to provide that motions made after notice of the pretrial confer-
ence or pending at the time of the conference may be heard by the pre-
trial judge. Louisell, supra note 66, at 663 & n.102; Comment, supra note
14, at 1019 n.13. However, the practice of hearing motions at the confer-
ence has been criticized for destroying the desired informal atmosphere of
voluntary cooperation. Delehant, supra note 70, at 25; 72 YALE L.J. 383,
391 (1962).
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motions which are noticed for the first time at the pretrial con-
ference, provided that the opposing party is not taken by surprise.73
And finally, they will occasionally make coercive determinations on
questions of law which have not been authorized by statute for
pretrial determination, but which they feel will "aid in the disposi-
tion of the action. '
74
In light of the above precedent, if the pretrial motion to exclude
were legitimated by statutory codification, and particularly if an
exclusionary motion were pending at the time of the pretrial con-
ference, the court would undoubtedly have the authority to make a
binding order. On the other hand, if there were no statute author-
izing the pretrial determination of evidence questions, the court
might be reluctant to issue a coercive exclusionary evidence ruling
solely on the basis of its authority under the catchall clause.
Strictly speaking, moreover, the catchall clause does not empower
the court to make any type of coercive evidence ruling. Federal
Rule 16 merely permits the court to consider such other matters as
may aid in the disposition of the action. Therefore, it might be
desirable to amend Federal Rule 16 and similarly-worded state
statutes in the following manner: "to consider [and determine]
(6) Such other matters [including questions of evidence,
raised on the motion of any party or by the court] as may aid in the
disposition of the action."7 5  While such an amendment would
merely restate existing law in many jurisdictions, it would never-
theless serve an important function by expressly empowering the
court to rule on pretrial motions to exclude inadmissible evidence.
73 J. CONWAY, supra note 18, § 30.01; H. NiMs, supra note 51, at 132,
140-41; Louisell, supra note 66, at 663; Comment, supra note 14, at 1020-21;
72 YALE L.J. 383, 387-91 (1962).
74 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 16.16, at 1121-23 (2d ed. 1960); H.
NiMs, supra note 51, at 122; Griffis, Preparation of a Personal Injury Case
for Pretrial Conference, 29 F.R.D. 330, 343 (1962); Kincaid, supra note 72,
at 442, 447; Comment, supra note 14, at 1020-21. There are several state
and federal cases in which pretrial evidence questions have been author-
ized for determination at the pretrial conference. E.g., Independent Iron
Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Berger v. Brannan, 172 F.2d 241, 243 (10th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949); Parmelee Transp. Co. v.
Keeshin, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 16.261, Case 1 (N.D. Ill. 1960); Hertz v.
Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Ulrich v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 2
FMR.D. 357 (W.D. Ky. 1942); Penn v. Auto. Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 337 (D.
Ore. 1939); Bradbeer v. Scott, 193 Cal. App. 2d 575, 14 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1961);
Edenfield v. Crisp, 186 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
75 See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.16 for use of the phrase "consider and deter-
mine." In construing this statute, the court in Collier v. McKesson, 121
So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960), held that the pretrial judge
should "specify by order . . . any preliminary rulings on matters of law
relating to the case and as to the competency and admissibility of evi-
dence. .. "
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III. EVIDENCE ISSUES AMENABLE TO PRETRIAL EXCLUSIONARY RULINGS
There is no theoretical limit to the types of evidence issues which
can profitably be determined prior to the trial.76 From a purely
practical standpoint, of course, the power of the judge to make pre-
trial evidence rulings is necessarily limited by his inability to fore-
see all the circumstances of the trial.7 7 If a relevancy decision calls
for the balancing of probative factors which must be weighed in the
context of the trial, for example, the court will not be able to make a
satisfactory pretrial admissibility determination.78 Similarly, if the
evidence question involves the determination of controverted issues
of fact which must be considered again at the trial, the court may
not want to require a pretrial presentation of proof.79 But even
when these practical limitations are taken into account, there still
remains a broad range of evidentiary items whose direct or indirect
communication to the jury can be effectively prohibited by utilizing
the pretrial motion to exclude. It is therefore important to note
that excessive use of the motion tends to foster a doctrine of judicial
restraint in granting the moving party's request.80 Thus the mo-
tion should be reserved for complex admissibility issues that will
benefit by careful pretrial deliberation, for evidence rulings which
will definitely eliminate interruptions and delay during the trial,
and for exclusionary rulings that will protect the litigant's right
to a fair and impartial jury trial.81 Examining the cases in which
pretrial motions to exclude have been utilized in accordance with
the above criteria, one can distinguish three general classes of ad-
missibility issues which seem particularly appropriate for pretrial
determination.
The first of these classes is composed of those admissibility is-
sues which can be determined by applying technical exclusionary
evidence rules, such as the hearsay rule, the original documents
rule, the rules relating to the competency of witnesses, and the
rules governing the privileges of parties and witnesses.82 The
issues presented are often difficult, but they are nevertheless gov-
erned by well-defined standards which are not normally affected
by the circumstances of the trial.83 Courts have, therefore, issued
76 Davis, supra note 9, at 234.
77 LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 274 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965).
78 State v. Flett, 234 Ore. 124, 129-30, 380 P.2d 634, 637 (1963); Johns v.
State, 155 Tex. Crim. 503, 506-07, 236 S.W.2d 820, 822 (1951).
79 See note 83 infra.
80 Cook v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 414 Pa. 154, 160, 199 A.2d 446, 449
(1964); Kromzer, supra note 9, at 183, 187.
81 See pp. 743-45 supra.
82 For a suggestion that this is the only type of admissibility determina-
tion which can be made prior to trial see Comment, supra note 14, at 1032-
38. A discussion of the distinction between relevancy questions and issues
calling for the application of technical exclusionary rules can be found in
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 53, at 125.
88 The application of a technical exclusionary rule may require the
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pretrial evidence rulings concerning prior reported testimony,8 4
depositions taken for prior cases,85 business records,8 6 records of
claims brought under laws administered by the Veterans' Adminis-
tration,8 7 and Veterans' Administration percentage of disability
ratings.8 The pretrial presentation of such admissibility issues is
particularly appropriate because it permits the court to give more
careful consideration to the application of the complex exclusionary
evidence rules involved.
An equally important function of the pretrial motion to exclude
is to prohibit the introduction of evidence which will have a po-
tentially prejudicial impact on the jury. Unfortunately, the de-
termination of relevancy issues involves the balancing of probative
values against probative dangers, not the application of technical
exclusionary rules of evidence.8 9 Since this process of balancing
intangibles calls for a large measure of individual judgment, the de-
cision is often said to come within the discretion of the trial judge,
who is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances of the
trial.90 But in certain areas, the relevancy of particular types of
evidence has been challenged so repeatedly that the court's leeway
of discretion has hardened into binding rules of precedent. 91 Be-
cause these rules are virtually as well-established as the technical
determination of a preliminary question of fact. C. MCCORMICK, supra note
2, § 53, at 122. This determination is traditionally made by the judge, not
the jury. Id. § 53, at 123. Nevertheless, because all other controverted is-
sues of fact must be determined at the trial, the judge may prefer to post-
pone the presentation of proof on the preliminary question of fact until
the time of the trial.
84 Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Penn v. Auto. Ins.
Co., 27 F. Supp. 337 (D. Ore. 1939).
85 Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
86 LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 274 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Frank, 227
F. Supp. 948, 949 (D. Conn. 1964) (advisory opinion instead of binding
evidence ruling).
87 Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766, 767, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963).
88 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Finney, 346 S.W.2d 917, 918-19 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961). Opposing counsel claimed for the first time on appeal that
the evidence excluded as hearsay should have been admitted during the
trial for impeachment purposes. The court found his claim without merit
because he had failed to make an offer of proof at the trial showing why
the disability rating should no longer be excluded. Nevertheless, the case
is illustrative of the complications which can arise when the circumstances
of the trial make previously excluded evidence admissible for unforeseen
reasons. One solution to this problem is suggested at pp. 756-57 infra.
89 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 53, 122. To determine relevancy, the
probative worth of the evidence must be balanced against the dangers of
(1) unduly arousing the jury's emotions of prejudice, hostility, or sym-
pathy, (2) confusing, misleading, or distracting the jury, (3) consuming
an undue amount of time, and (4) unfairly surprising the opponent. UNI-
FORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 45.
90 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 45.
91 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 152, at 320.
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exclusionary evidence rules, they are equally applicable to the pre-
trial determination of admissibility issues. Therefore, pretrial mo-
tions to exclude can be effectively directed against the introduction
of proof of character, such as circumstantial evidence of the mov-
ant's conduct or state of mind,92 proof of other crimes,93 and proof
of personal habits. 94 It may also be directed against proof of similar
happenings or transactions in jurisdictions where prior claims, suits,
or settlements are inadmissible to prove that the movant is a
chronic litigant,95 or where prices paid on sales of comparable land
are inadmissible in condemnation proceedings. 6 Matters falling
within the collateral source rule, such as evidence that the de-
fendant is protected by liability insurance and evidence of a
spouse's remarriage in wrongful death actions, are illustrative of
other types of evidence which have frequently been excluded by
reason of established rules of precedent.97
Even if these rules of precedent do not clearly govern, the court
is still competent to make a third class of pretrial evidence rulings;
whenever counsel can show that the probative danger of submitting
the evidence far outweighs its probative value, the court is em-
powered to grant a pretrial motion to exclude. Thus, if there is a
grave probability that the evidence in question will confuse or dis-
tract the jury or consume an undue amount of time, the court will
frequently issue a pretrial exclusionary order. 98 Similarly, if the
court can reduce the risk of surprise to the proponent of the evi-
dence by warning him in advance that it will not be admitted and
that he must introduce substitute evidence at the trial, a pretrial
motion to exclude will customarily be granted.9 9 Finally, if the
92 For example, female plaintiffs in personal injury suits may seek to
exclude any reference to their illicit relationships with members of the
opposite sex. Bradford v. Birmingham Elec. Co., 227 Ala. 285, 149 So. 729(1933) (motion denied because worded too vaguely); Bradbeer v. Scott,
193 Cal. App. 2d 575, 14 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1961) (motion granted).
93 Proof of other crimes was excluded in McClintock v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 393 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) and Scarborough v. State, 171
Tex. Crim. 83, 344 S.W.2d 886 (1961). However, proof of other criminal
acts was admitted in Bills v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 369, 327 S.W.2d 751(1959) (part of the res gestae) and in Johns v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 503,
236 S.W.2d 820 (1951) (showed propensity for unnatural sexual relations
with person concerned in crime on trial).
94 Davis, supra note 9, at 235; Kromzer, supra note 9, at 183.
95 Davis, supra note 9, at 236-37.96 United States v. Certain Tracts of Land, 57 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Cal.
1944).
97 Davis, supra note 9, at 234; Kromzer, supra note 9, at 183.
98 Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d
656, 669 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963). "[A]n excursion
into each of these ... matters ... would result in a tremendous prolifera-
tion of proof which would literally overwhelm the jury with diversionary
facts and extend the trial interminably." Id. at 670.
99 In condemnation proceedings, the condemnor's motion to exclude is
frequently granted on the theory that it will permit the condemnee to
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prejudicial impact of submitting the evidence to the jury far out-
weighs its potential probative worth, the court will normally pro-
hibit its introduction at the trial.10 0 Borderline cases will inevitably
arise, however. If counsel anticipates that the court will be reluc-
tant to make a pretrial admissibility determination, he may simply
want to request an order prohibiting the communication of the evi-
dence to the jury.1° 1 This will permit the court to postpone its ad-
missibility determination until all the probative factors can be
weighed in the context of the trial.
IV. THE PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF THE PRETRIAL MOTION TO EXCLUDE
The potential utility of the pretrial motion to exclude cannot be
fully developed unless proper recognition is given to the grant or
denial of the motion in subsequent proceedings.10 2 It is therefore
prepare a more accurate valuation of his severance damages. Sacramento
& San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d 60, 68, 29 Cal. Rptr.
847, 852-53 (1963), modified, 217 Cal. App. 2d 611, 31 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963);
State v. Baker Bros. Nursery, 366 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1963). "The motion to
exclude adopted in this case . . . reduces the surprise factor. It is calcu-
lated to iron out a disputed issue . . . before the actual expression of value
opinions." Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, supra at 68,
29 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
100 Huff v. New York Cent. R.R., 12 DEFENSE L.J. 310 (1963), aff'd on
other grounds, 116 Ohio App. 32, 186 N.E.2d 478 (1961) (references to
publicity received by daughter of deceased whose letter to president re-
sulted in the installation of improved signals at crossing where her father
had been killed); Cook v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 414 Pa. 154, 199 A.2d
446 (1964) (evidence suggesting that plaintiff in personal injury action was
inebriated was excluded when there was no proof of intoxication).
A striking development in this area has been the use of the motion to
exclude prior convictions or acts of misconduct which might be referred
to in attempting to impeach the defendant in a criminal suit who wants to
testify in his own behalf. State v. Hawthorne, 90 N.J. Super. 545, 218 A.2d
430 (1966) (previous convictions for robbery and theft excluded from ac-
tion for assault and battery); State v. Smith, 189 Wash. 422, 65 P.2d 1075
(1937) (desertion from Marines excluded from action for assault); Gourley,
Effective Pretrial Must Be the Beginning of Trial, 28 F.R.D. 165 (1961)
(discusses'defendant in civil suit).
101 See p. 755 infra for a more complete discussion of the preliminary
motion to exclude. This use of the motion should not be abused, however.
See notes 43 & 80 supra.
102 Unless the pretrial motion to exclude is properly drafted, it cannot
possibly have the desired effect at the trial or on appeal. Therefore, a few
cautionary words would seem to be in order concerning the motion's form
and content.' Above all, the motion must be worded precisely. The issues
should be clearly defined, for otherwise the court will not be able to rule
on the admissibility of the evidence. Allegations must be made concerning
counsel's reasons for believing that the evidence will be offered and his
reasons for believing that the evidence is inadmissible. A statement should
be included explaining why an ordinary objection during the trial would
not be adequate. And finally, to prevent the motion from resulting in an
easily-evaded order, the evidence should be' particularized and opposing
counsel and his client should:be instructed not to make any direct or in-
direct references to the evidence or to the granting of the motion. For
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important to note that the courts have not been at all consistent
in determining the procedural effect of pretrial exclusionary evi-
dence rulings. Perhaps the current lack of uniformity can be at-
tributed to the dual function performed by the pretrial motion to
exclude. The motion (which may be filed for a separate hearing0 3
or noticed initially at a pretrial conference10 4 ) seeks both an ad-
missibility determination and a binding court order prohibiting the
communication of the evidence to the jury. If a preliminary mo-
tion to exclude is filed, only a binding court order is requested prior
to the trial. The proponent of the evidence is thereby instructed to
make his offer of proof to the court out of the hearing of the jury,
and the admissibility determination is postponed until the time of
the trial.10 5 When an absolute motion to exclude is brought, how-
ever, the admissibility determination is sought in advance of trial
and then, if the evidence is ruled inadmissibile, a binding court
order is requested. 10 6
sample drafts of pretrial exclusionary motions, see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Finney, 346 S.W.2d 917, 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d
1087, 1098-99 (1964); Davis, supra note 9, at 232.
103 E.g., Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App.
2d 60, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963), modified, 217 Cal. App. 2d 611, 31 Cal. Rptr.
754 (1963); Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
If the motion calls for a complex or relatively unprecedented decision,
it is best to file it a few weeks in advance of the trial, thereby permitting
the judge to request the submission of briefs and to carefully research his
ruling. On the other hand, if the motion involves the application of well-
settled rules or the balancing of probative values and dangers, a formal
hearing may be requested just prior to the voir dire examination. See
Kromzer, supra note 9, at 182-84.
104 E.g., Ulrich v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 2 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Ky. 1942);
Bradbeer v. Scott, 193 Cal. App. 2d 575, 14 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1961).
It is frequently stated that if a pretrial conference is held, all before-
trial motions should be noticed prior to or during the conference. Kromzer,
supra note 9, at 183; Parnell, Preparation for Trial, 39 WIs. BAR BULL. 12, 20
(1966).. The motion to exclude may be raised for the first time during the
conference. But if it is known in advance that a motion to exclude will be
raised at the conference, a request for the exclusionary ruling should be
noticed in the pretrial statement which is required in many jurisdictions
by the local rules of practice. Comment, supra note 14, at 1046. This is
particularly important when the issues presented by the motion are com-
plex, for it enables the judge and opposing counsel to prepare themselves
i advance. See Ryan & Wickhem, supra note 68, at 14.
When an evidence question is considered at the pretrial conference,
both parties should request a written record of at least that portion of the
conference covering the introduction and discussion of the motion in order
to preserve error for appeal purposes. See Independent Iron Works, Inc.
V. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 922 (1963); Zelof v. Capital City Transfer, Inc., 29 Wis. 2d 384, 139
N.W.2d 1 (1966); Comment, supra note 14, at 1047. If the motion is granted,
the moving party should then take steps to have the exclusionary ruling
incorporated into the pretrial order. H. NIMs, supra note 51, at 155-58.
105 Scarborough v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 83, 86-87, 344 S.W.2d 886, 889
(1961); Davis, supra note 9, at 233; Kromzer, supra note 9, at 185-86.
106 State v. Hawthorne, 90 N.J. Super. 545, 218 A.2d 430 (1966) ;Kio mizer,
supra note 9, at 185-86.
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If the pretrial motion to exclude is denied, whether preliminary
or absolute, the proponent of the evidence may proceed to make
his offer of proof in the presence of the jury.10 7 The moving party
will frequently respond by voicing an objection, particularly if the
trial judge did not preside over the pretrial proceedings. 0 8 But
such an objection should be required to preserve error for appeal
purposes only when a preliminary motion is denied (i.e., when the
admissibility determination is postponed until the time of the
trial 1 9) or when an absolute motion to exclude is denied and the
moving party subsequently discovers new facts which make the
evidence inadmissible.110 The requirement of an objection must be
imposed in the latter case to prevent the moving party from re-
maining silent at the trial, waiting to take advantage of an inbuilt
error on appeal."'
If a preliminary motion to exclude is granted, the proponent of
the evidence must present an offer of proof at the trial (out of the
hearing of the jury) in order to obtain an appealable evidence
ruling.112 When an absolute motion to exclude is granted, how-
ever, the offer of proof has been made during the pretrial proceed-
ings.113 The proponent is, therefore, not required to present a
107 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335
(Tex. 1963); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Finney, 346 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961); Alamo Express, Inc. v. Wafer, 333 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960); Davis, supra note 9, at 233-34; Kromzer, supra note 9, at 186.
108 See Comment, supra note 14, at 1048-49 for a discussion of the prob-
lems which arise when the same judge does not preside over the trial and
pretrial proceedings.
109 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335
(Tex. 1963); Davis, supra note 9, at 233-34; Kromzer, supra note 9, at 186.
1 110 The authorities are divided concerning the need for the moving
party to reobject when an absolute motion to exclude is denied if no new
circumstances have arisen which would make the evidence inadmissible.
For example, in Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215
Cal. App. 2d 60, 68, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852-53 (1963), modified, 217 Cal.
App. 2d 611, 31 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963), no reobjection was required, but in
Jackson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 529, 530, 133 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1963), the
court held that the moving party waived his objection by failing to renew
it at the trial. The better decisions would seem to be those which do not
require a reobjection, particularly since no reobjection is required under
the traditional rules of evidence following the court's refusal to sustain an
objection. J. CONWAY, supra.note 18, § 74.10; C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 2,
§ 52, at 120. The court has clearly indicated its position, and subsequent
objections would therefore be futile, time-consuming, and possibly prej-
udicial. Id.
11i For a discussion of the problems created by an inbuilt error on ap-
peal, see Kromzer, supra note 9, at 186.
112 Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963);
Scarborough v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 83, 86-87, 344 S.W.2d 886, 889 (1961);
Davis, supra note 9, at 233-34. The moving party must voice his objection
at the time the proponent makes his offer of proof. Kromzer, supra note
9, at 186.
118 Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d
656, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Aley v. Great
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second offer of proof at the trial unless new facts are subsequently
discovered which would render the excluded evidence admissible,
in which case the proponent must move for reconsideration of the
pretrial exclusionary ruling out of the hearing of the jury." 4 This
permits the court to vacate the pretrial order, thereby protecting
the legitimate interests of the proponent of the evidence without
permitting him to claim error for the first time on appeal.",5
Once a pretrial motion to exclude has been granted, the moving
party has obtained a binding court order prohibiting the communi-
cation of the evidence to the jury.116 It is the court's responsibility
to assume the initiative in compelling compliance with its order." 7
Therefore, if the order is violated, the moving party should not be
required to voice an objection in the presence of the jury." 8 In-
stead, he should simply be expected to approach the bench to re-
mind the court of the provisions of the pretrial order and to request
the application of the appropriate sanctions." 9 This will eliminate
the risk of sensitizing the jury to the excluded evidence and, at the
same time, will protect the moving party against charges that he
has waived his objection for purposes of appeal.
V. CONCLUSION
The pretrial motion to exclude is a novel procedural device which
is simultaneously capable of promoting fair and impartial jury
trials, and efficiency and economy in judicial administration.
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 211 F. Supp. 500, 503 (W.D. Mo. 1962) (outlines pro-
cedure for making pretrial admissibility determination at pretrial confer-
ence); Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d
60, 68, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852-53 (1963), modified, 217 Cal. App. 2d 611, 31
Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963); State v. Hawthorne, 90 N.J. Super. 545, 549, 218 A.2d
430, 432 (1966); Comment, supra note 14, at 1047.
114 See note 110 supra.
115 See Kromzer, supra note 9, at 186.
116 For a suggestion that the pretrial conference order can be so easily
modified that it will not adequately protect the interests of the moving
party see Comment, supra note 14, at 1041-46.
117 Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963);
Kromzer, supra note 9, at 181-82.
118 Bradbeer v. Scott, 193 Cal. App. 2d 575, 14 Cal. Rptr. 458, 459 (1961);
McClintock v. Travelers Ins. Co., 393 S.W.2d 421, 423-24 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965); State v. Smith, 189 Wash. 422, 429, 65 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1937); -see
Mixis v. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Co., 26 Wis. 2d 488, 132 N.W.2d 769 (1965)
(pre-voir dire conference objection to voir dire questions concerning in-
surance adequate to preserve claimed error on appeal). An objection will
merely serve to call the jury's attention to the improperly submitted evi-
dence. Bradbeer v. Scott, supra at 577, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
119 To enforce its order, the court may impose direct sanctions (repri-
mand or contempt citation) or quasi-sanctions (mistrial or new trial). See
p. 744 supra. A mistrial may be prejudicial to the interests of the moving
party, however. State v. Flett, 234 Ore. 124, 129-30; 380 P.2d 634, 637
(1963); Cook v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 414 Pa. 154, 158, 199 A.2d 446, 448
(1964). Therefore, the threat of a mistrial should simply be retained as a
sanction invocable at the moving party's option.
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Although it is generally recognized that pretrial evidence rulings
are an appropriate exercise of judicial power, statutory codifica-
tion would eliminate any doubts concerning the legitimacy of the
pretrial motion to exclude. The motion can be used most effect-
ively when (1) the admissibility issue calls for the application of
technical exclusionary rules of evidence or well-established rules
of precedent, or (2) the probative danger of submitting the evidence
far outweighs its probative value. Because the procedural effect
of a grant or denial of the motion to exclude remains uncertain, the
potential utility of the motion has not yet been fully developed.
JEAN C. LovE
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